Morality Without Revelation

Theism is a contentious subject with fervent opponents and defenders. But does this question even matter? Why should the presence of a divine being even affect the way we live our lives? Most of the arguments for god create a deistic god the sort that oversees the entire world but fail to argue convincingly for a specific deity.

Suppose then, that you accept these arguments. No religion has an entirely convincing argument over the others and much of the evidence is similar. Both Mormonism and mainstream Christianity rely upon eye-witness accounts. And Judaism, Islam, and Christianity all appeal to historical texts, and revelation. And much of the revelation itself could have been manmade. The Bible, Quran, and possibly every other holy book have the possibility of being manmade.

Revelation when applied to religion is direct communication from Deity to Man. Therefore, any revelation from the divine can only be revelation to the first person only and hearsay to the rest. [^1] No other man can directly experience the revelation that occurred to verify. Different religions claim incompatible revelations. Since they cannot all be true in the same sense, revelation alone cannot determine which religion is correct. Even if Moses, Muhammad, or another prophet genuinely experienced revelation, later generations only receive testimony, not revelation itself.

Then the accepting of deistic arguments, should not necessarily sway you to any particular god. Supposing this, then in what manner can man act and what manner should he act?

Perhaps the only bible granted to us is the natural world. It is a true universal revelation but it is lawless: though animals cooperate they also slaughter without mercy. Though birds care for their young, predators snake upon their prey. The natural order does not establish many guidelines for survival beyond the descriptive fact that cooperation tends to produce more success. The natural world has little to offer us beyond what is.

Therefore, the only source from which true morality must come from the nature of a rational agent itself. Any moral system must motivate action in order to be successful.

Commands that bear no relation to the motivations of the agent resemble telling a rock that it ought to rise upward: the statement may have grammatical form, but it cannot guide action.

Moral obligation therefore cannot exist independently of the individual capable of acting. An "ought" has force only insofar as it connects to the motivational structure of a rational being. This does not mean that every desire is moral, but rather that morality must begin with the only place where action can originate: the deliberating mind of the agent. Any moral statement can only be authoritative if the agent chooses to accept it.

If this is true, then external moral authorities are necessarily secondary. Societies change, traditions evolve, and religious interpretations diverge. Their authority depends upon whether individuals ultimately internalize them.

If this be true, then every external rule of morality is necessarily subordinate to the judgment of the individual. Society may command, priests may exhort, and governments may legislate, but none of these possess authority merely by existing. They persuade only where the mind assents. The source of action therefore lies not in the command, but in the person who receives it. To mistake obedience for authority is to confuse the instrument with the cause.

Every system of morality must also propose an end toward which it directs mankind. One commands obedience to God, another the greatest happiness of the greatest number, another the preservation of the state. Yet before any man can pursue these ends, he must first accept that they are his ends to pursue. No purpose can bind him until his own reason binds him to it. Thus every moral system, however grand its claims, ultimately returns to the tribunal of the individual mind. It follows that the first object of morality cannot be the pursuit of some external end, but the proper exercise of reason itself. For if reason is the faculty by which all moral obligations are examined, accepted, or rejected, then it is prior to every doctrine built upon it. A morality that neglects the rational agency of the individual erects a house while forgetting its foundation.

The duty of man, therefore, is not first to submit himself to ends chosen by another, but to become capable of choosing wisely for himself. It is in the free and deliberate exercise of reason that morality finds both its beginning and its authority. All other obligations derive their force from this one, and without it they are but assertions awaiting belief.

Let us accept, then, that man ought to pursue those ends which he has consciously and rationally chosen for himself. It does not follow that every desire deserves pursuit, nor that every inclination should be obeyed. Desire is often immediate; reason is reflective. The former presents an impulse, the latter examines whether that impulse accords with the life one has chosen to lead. A man who follows every appetite is no more self-directed than one who follows every command of another. In either case, he is governed by something other than himself.

But what goal should you pick? Can your goal be to become the world’s best murderer or a criminal? I answer, yes, if that is truly the end which his reason has adopted. Morality does not determine the content of a man's ends; it determines only that he pursue those ends consciously rather than blindly. A man who murders because he is swept away by passion is ruled by appetite. A man who murders because he has deliberately chosen such a life is, however terrible his purpose, at least its author.

But even among one's own ends, how is a choice to be made? Should a man become a guitarist or a pianist? A physician or an engineer? Should he climb mountains or write books? Morality cannot answer these questions, for they are not moral questions. They concern preference, talent, circumstance, and aspiration rather than obligation. To insist that morality choose among them is to ask of it what it was never intended to provide.

But then, one may ask how does one make practical daily decisions? Should one support one policy over the other? How should one structure his diet? Or how should one decide whether to donate to charity? I cannot give a direct yes or no. I cannot say all people should be vegan or vegetarian. I do not say that you should donate all you can to charity---as some utilitarians do. To prescribe the same ends for every man would merely replace the authority of revelation with the authority of the philosopher. But you may: consider the value brought to you from a policy and its assistance to your goals and make an informed decision.